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ABSTRACT
In this study I investigate sub-national governments to determine whether the accountability
derived from local elections improves the delivery of a vital resource – potable water – to the
population and, additionally, consider accessibility to improved sanitation. I utilize a cross-national
differenced random effects model of 156 countries from 1990-2007 and examine the complex
relationship between water, sanitation, and local government. This analysis finds that States

with locally elected municipal government have a higher percentage of people with access to
improved water and sanitation facilities as opposed to States without locally elected municipal
government.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Humanity’s need for clean drinking water cannot be overstated. From Mesopotamia to
London, great civilizations were built upon the banks of the Earth’s waterways. Water, more
than anything else, ensures humankind’s survival and prosperity. In fact, the human body needs
between 2-3 liters of water each day to survive (World Health Organization 2011). Yet, only
three percent of the world’s water supply is fresh, drinkable water (World Wildlife Fund 2016).
Of that three percent, less than one percent is accessible for human consumption (World Wildlife
Fund 2016).
As water plays the pivotal role in sustaining human life, the United Nation’s Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) prioritize the value of water. Outlined by MDG seven, target C, the
United Nations established the goal of halving the number of people without access to adequate
water and sanitation by 2015 (United Nations Department of Public Information 2016). Despite
the notable achievement of the water component of this goal, the sanitation aspect was not
accomplished (United Nations Department of Public Information 2016). In fact, the United
Nations approximates that 2.4 billion people remain without access to improved sanitation
facilities such as toilets that flush to a piped sewer system or ventilated pit latrines (United
Nations Department of Public Information 2016).
In 2016, the MDGs were succeeded by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
which also prioritize the value of water and sanitation in Goal Six: globally ensuring availability
and viable management of water and sanitation (United Nations Department of Public
Information 2016). Moreover, targets one and two of SDG six go further than the MDGs by
calling for universal and equitable accessibility to safe water and sanitation amenities for all by
2030 (United Nations Department of Public Information 2016).
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This goal is especially important as some reports estimate that up to 80 percent of
diarrheal diseases in developing countries stem from inadequate water and sanitation (United
Nations Department of Public Information 2003). Diseases caused by inadequate water,
sanitation, and hygiene are estimated to cost 443 million school days annually (United Nations
Department of Public Information 2006). Likewise, women without access to adequate toilets or
latrines often utilize open areas and are increasingly vulnerable to intimidation and abuse (United
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2016).
With the exponential growth of global water use, coupled with chronic water shortages,
the efficient management of water is more pressing than ever. It is estimated that, for every $1
invested in water and sanitation, there is a $5 return (World Health Organization 2004). This
financial return is realized through increased levels of individual productivity, reduced health
care costs, and the prevention of illness, disability, and death (World Health Organization 2004).
Water shortages and its consequences, however, do not impact developing countries
alone. In 2014 in an effort to reduce expenditures, the City of Flint, Michigan began to transition
their primary water source from Lake Huron to the Flint River (New York Times 2016). While
in theory this transition was initiated as a cost cutting measure for the city, the transition led to
widespread lead contamination of the local water source (New York Times 2016). Additionally,
in April 2015, the state of California initiated mandatory water use restrictions to combat
shrinking water supplies and ensure an adequate supply of drinking water for the summer
drought (O'Connor 2015).
In principle, democracies respond to the needs of the many, yet, often in developing
democracies, it is not clear that elected governments do a better job than non-elected
governments on this issue. In this study I investigate sub-national governments to determine
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whether the accountability derived from local elections improves the delivery of a vital resource
– potable water – to the population and will, additionally, consider accessibility to improved
sanitation. I utilize a cross-national differenced random effects model of 156 countries from
1990-2007 and examine the complex relationship between water, sanitation and local
government.
2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The broader question of who or what governs water and sanitation and therefore,
universal accessibility to adequate water and sanitation supply is highly important. The
implications of water insecurity and lack of sanitation are immense and impact not only an
individual's livelihood but also the overall ability of society to operate. As such, accessibility to
water and sanitation spans multiple disciplines, including, economics, public administration, and
public health. The main discussion regarding the distribution of this scarce resource draws from
the following literature: redistributive politics, institutions, political competition, decentralization
and governance. Below is not an exhaustive literature review, but rather, an introduction to the
primary approaches utilized by scholars investigating factors that impact water and sanitation
accessibility and more generally, the delivery of public goods and services.
2.1

Redistributive Politics
Literature concerning redistributive politics contributes to answering questions regarding

the relationship between local government and the accessibility of water and sanitation. While
there is not a unanimously accepted definition of redistributive politics, Dixit and Londregan
(1996) identify two distinct types of redistribution, grand and economic. Grand redistributive
politics is defined as the allocation of public goods and services to promote an egalitarian society
by allotting benefits to the public through social welfare programs or progressive taxation (Dixit
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and Londregan 1996). Essentially, the grand redistributive programs are established for
substantial periods of time and modified only when there is a significant ideological shift in the
populations' beliefs (Dixit and Londregan 1996). Alternatively, economic redistribution
manifests itself in the forms of grants, targeted tariff protection, construction projects, and "pork
barrel" spending (Dixit and Londregan 1996: 1133). Dixit and Londregan (1996) state that in the
United States and elsewhere, economic redistribution is much more the reality of everyday
policymaking, compared to the grand redistribution, which happens less frequently.
Within the redistributive literature, the elected officials relationship with the population is
vital. Particularly, discussions over whether political parties focus on core voters or swing voters
for the delivery of public goods and services prove to be a point of contention amongst scholars
(Dixit and Londregan 1996; Rosenzweig 2015). The core voter theory asserts that ideological
commonalities incentivize incumbent governments to provide increased levels of public goods
and services to areas where they have increased levels of electoral support (Cox and McCubbins
1986).
There are two primary focuses of the argument for a core voter strategy (Rosenzweig
2015). The first focus asserts that the ruling party will target efforts to benefit their most loyal
voters (Hiskey 1999). Essentially, the targeted support provided by the ruling party to their core
support is a way to penalize those supporting the opposition parties and deter future voter
defections by rewarding supporters for party loyalty (Hiskey 1999). The second focus asserts that
if a political party has clear ideas regarding how core voters will react as a result of their
continued communication with the party, then during competitive elections, risk averse parties
will align their pork with base voters as they believe that they are a worthy electoral investment
(Cox and McCubbins 1986).
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In contrast to the core voter theory is the swing voter theory. Essentially, the swing voter
theory, forecasts that public goods and services are overwhelmingly allocated to centrist voters
as political parties attempt to garner the support of the center of the political spectrum (Kroth et
al. 2016). Dixit and Londregan (1996) create a model of political competition in which two
parties contend for voters' electoral support. The central idea is that voters have diverse
preferences, and targeted benefits can influence voters' party loyalties (Dixit and Londregan
1996). Dixit and Londregan (1996) assert that political parties are partial to moderate voters who
can be influenced by redistributive benefits. Accordingly, voters are interested in the
redistribution of benefits to themselves (Dixit and Londregan 1996).
Various models of political competition emphasize the redistributive politics question in
isolation, considering how resources will be distributed under majority rule (Shepsle and
Weingast 1981). Other models emphasize primarily the position-issues aspect of political
competition claiming that, “…apathy among citizens toward elections, ignorance of the issues,
the tendency of parties in a two-party system to resemble each other, and the anti-consumer bias
of government action can all be explained logically as efficient reactions to imperfect
information in a large democracy” (Downs 1957: 149).
Scholars such as Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) investigate the balanced-budget
redistribution between socio-economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between
two political parties (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). Essentially, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)
assert that the driving forces behind government-driven redistributions of income and wealth are
not well understood. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) find that under the assumption that two
competing political parties will try to maximize their number of votes from self-interested voters,
an equilibrium solution for redistributive policy will exist as long as a sufficient degree of
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preferential uncertainty is present in the electorate. In instances when no variations in party
preferences are present, and consumption preferences are varied, redistributions will be furthered
until the average marginal utility of consumption is equal across socioeconomic groups
(Lindbeck and Weibull 1987).
While the redistributive politics literature makes unique contributions to the field, these
theories are seldom applied to global sanitation and water accessibility. Thus, in this analysis I
will further this literature by looking specifically at the water and sanitation component of
redistributive politics.
2.2

Institutions
The second major approach utilized to investigate water accessibility and sanitation is

analyzing the efficiency of institutions in society. The principle idea is that strengthening
institutional capacity and organizational efficiency indirectly leads to a higher level of water
accessibility. Essentially, if the institutions function effectively, then the distribution of public
goods and services, including water, will also be efficient.
Another component within the institutions literature is the importance of public
infrastructure as an impetus to economic development (Duffy-Deno and Eberts 1991; Mera
1973; Snickars1989; Cutanda and Paricio1994). Various reasons are offered for this importance.
Perhaps, the most compelling reason emphasizes the role of "public capital as: an ‘unpaid factor
of production' which directly leads to increased output"(Lewis 1998, p.42). Essentially,
economic growth leads to higher municipal incomes and ultimately translates to improved water
within a society (Lewis 1998). In this perspective, many scholars investigate the institution of the
party system in influencing policy-making and governance (Banerjee and Hankla 2014).
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Over the years, scholars have taken a vested interest in the relationship between party
systems and the delivery of public goods and services. Party systems are analyzed in various
capacities including, the number of effective parties and their respective stability over time
(Banerjee and Hankla 2014). Alternatively, another area of research includes understanding why
party systems vary drastically cross-nationally and utilizing the different parties as independent
variables to explain policy outcomes (Banerjee and Hankla 2014). Particularly of interest, is the
number of parties present within in society that will lead to the optimum level of political
competition facilitating the delivery of public goods and services. In fact, literature on electoral
competition demonstrates that reduced numbers of effective parties may inhibit the delivery of
public goods and services by reducing the chance of losing seats during elections (Banerjee and
Hankla 2014).
Moreover, many scholars analyze party stability as an indicator of public goods provision
(Banerjee and Hankla 2014). Predominantly, this area of research focuses on party stability,
which is asserted to lead to improved state governance. Essentially, stable party systems enable
politicians to "think beyond transfers to their constituents" (Banerjee and Hankla 2014: 5).
Alternatively, scholars claim that increased party fragmentation reduces the motivation of elected
officials to provide public goods and services (Banerjee and Hankla 2014). In fact, scholars have
linked higher levels of party fragmentation with unfavorable policy outcomes (Banerjee and
Hankla 2014).
The advancement of electoral institutions has been an integral component of good
governance programs in international development agencies since the 1990s (Carothers 1995).
However, Cleary (2007) asserts that this confidence in electoral institutions is not justified, as
there are many limitations of elections as tools of democracy. For instance, "biased electoral
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rules, principal-agent problems, clientelism, and authoritarian political cultures" are all potential
inhibitors of an elections ability to create attentive, responsible, or participatory governments”
(Cleary 2007: 283). While there is no question that elections have the capacity to generate a
level of responsiveness and accountability, the usefulness differs across "institutional and
political settings" (Cleary 2007: 283).
While the institutional literature makes interesting contributions to the field, these
theories are not analyzed in tandem with global sanitation and water accessibility. Thus, in this
analysis, I look at the aforementioned variables in tandem with their relationship between water
and sanitation accessibility and redistributive politics and institutions.
2.3

Political Competition
Insight into what makes a government receptive to their people’s needs is an integral

issue in the discussion of the delivery of public goods and services. Scholars often refer to
political competition as a significant instigator of beneficial political and social outcomes.
Outcomes, which include improved representation from elected officials (Powell 2000),
enhanced economic performance (Przeworksi and Limongi 1993), the protection of human rights
(Beer and Mitchell 2004), and decreased global conflict (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999;
Diamond 1999). Likewise, in many instances scholars argue that higher levels of political
competition lead to improved delivery of public goods and services as it encourages elected
officials to respond to the demands of citizens (Barro 1973; Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferejohn
1986; Hiskey 1999; and Wittman 1989, 1995).
Other scholars such as, Cleary (2007) assert that there are two competing theories
regarding how democracy produces responsive government. First, electoral theories of
democracy postulate that elected officials are responsive to public demands because citizens can
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remove unfavorable politicians and select another candidate (Cleary 2007). For instance, elected
officials frequently desire to remain in office or seek higher-level political positions in the future
(Taylor 1992). If there is no immediate reelection threat, elected officials may still be responsive
to their constituents needs so as to establish good rapport for their future political ambitions
(Taylor 1992). Likewise, the elected official’s desire to protect or enhance their political party
may ensure that elected representatives are responsive to their citizenry (Taylor 1992). Political
parties are capable of incentivizing responsiveness in elected officials via managing political
appointments, electoral nominations and government largesse (Carey 1996; Taylor 1992).
Second, there is the participatory theory, which links responsiveness to a population’s
ability to outline their needs and influence government through other political action (Cleary
2007). Hirschman (1970) asserts that the elected officials will be responsive to constituent
activism that poses an electoral threat. Essentially, citizen participation informs elected officials
about their population's concerns, however, the government is attentive to these demands when
the afflicted population poses a credible threat to vote the elected official out of office
(Hirschman 1970).
Participatory theory further argues that a relationship exists between government
performance and involvement when there are competitive elections (Hirschman 1970).
However, in addition to a credible threat to elected office, alternative mechanisms are asserted to
explain government responsiveness. For instance, participation can lead to increased
responsiveness from elected officials if there are connections between the elected officials and
their constituency through social networks (Putnam 1993). The idea is that social networks can
reinforce social norms leading to improved government performance and attentiveness (Putnam
1993).
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Cleary (2007) tests both electoral theories of democracy and participatory theory using
his original dataset that combines "electoral, socioeconomic, and public-financial indicators" for
all the municipalities in Mexico between the years 1989 to 2000 (Cleary 2007, p. 283). Cleary’s
analysis, however, finds that electoral competition has no effect on municipal government
performance (Cleary 2007). Rather than the threat of electoral punishment facilitating political
responsiveness, the caliber of local authorities in Mexico is contingent on an active citizenry and
collaboration between elected officials and their constituents (Cleary 2007). As such,
responsiveness may rely on a population’s ability to outline their needs and pressure officials
through "protest, public speech, lobbying, collective action, or direct contact with government
officials" (Cleary 2007, p. 284).
Furthermore, Besley and Burgess (2002) conduct a unique analysis investigating the
importance of the flow of information regarding policy actions and political responsiveness
within a society. An important question Besley and Burgess (2002) pose includes, what
institutions and mechanisms enable vulnerable citizens to have their preferences represented in
policy. Besley and Burgess (2002) assert that it is vital that vulnerable populations have enough
electoral power to swing outcomes if politicians are to be responsive to their demands which is
more likely to be true when electoral turnout is high and political competition is intense (Besley
and Burgess 2002). Using India as a case study, Besley and Burgess (2002) find that state
governments are increasingly attentive to the needs of their local population when there are
higher levels of media circulation and electoral accountability. This relationship indicates that
there are distinct roles for both the media and democratic institutions in furthering the
preferences of citizens in the policy agenda (Besley and Burgess 2002).
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Finally, Rosenzweig (2015) poses the question of whether, "electoral competition
[improves the provision of public goods] in dominant-party regimes"(Rosenzweig 2015: 72).
Rosenzweig’s (2015) analysis asserts that local electoral competition does not impact dominantparty systems significantly to upset their hold on office. However, political competition does
advance the delivery of public goods and services (Rosenzweig 2015). This improved delivery
of public goods is a result of the dominant party's ambition to increase their governing majority
(Rosenzweig 2015). In the case study of Tanzania, Rosenzweig (2015) shows that increased
levels of political competition lead to greater accessibility to public goods and services. The
central idea is that political competition is linked to improved public goods delivery as the
dominant party focuses their resources on the districts with higher levels of competition in an
effort to increase their domination (Rosenzweig 2015).
2.4

Decentralization and Governance
The final of the major approaches utilized when analyzing the accessibility to improved

water and sanitation is the relationship between the type of government within a country and its
capacity to distribute resources and the decentralization of power to subnational authorities.
Various studies suggest that democracies deliver public goods and services more efficiently than
autocratic regimes (Lake and Baum 2001, Buena de Mesquita et al. 2003, Min 2015). Whether
it’s the state level government or the local-level government, scholars overwhelmingly consider
the typed of government to be of the utmost importance when analyzing resource distribution
(Lucia De Stefano et al. 2014; Eduardi Araral and Yahua Wang 2015).
Martinez-Bravo et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2004) assert that local elections in Chinese
municipalities improved the distribution of public goods and services. Other scholars such as
Skoufias et al. (2014) investigated the impact of direct elections in Indonesian municipalities and
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Olken (2010) provides the theoretical backing that "participatory, rather than representative,
democracy in Indonesian villages led to higher voter satisfaction with development projects"
(Kroth et al. 2016, p.22). Various scholars suggest that media access leads democracies to better
serve their local populations by providing local goods and services as a result of showcasing
political competition between elected officials (Sen 1999).
Elections are tools utilized to establish political accountability (Bardhan 2002). Often,
nongovernmental organizations and alternative institutional devices are used to bolster local
accountability (Bardhan 2002). Likewise, "yardstick competition," when districts are compared
with each other, is another way to increase accountability (Besley and Case 1995). Essentially,
the effort of elected officials is not directly visible to the population, as such, when unfavorable
outcomes occur, these officials can convey that they put their best efforts forth under the
circumstances (Besley and Case 1995). However, if the adverse results that divide effort and
outcomes correlate across districts, then yardstick competition can serve as a performance
indicator of the particular elected official (Besley and Case 1995).
Likewise, decentralization, defined as the central government devolving power to subnational authorities, is widely accepted as a way to improve the delivery of public goods and
services to the population (Mawhood 1983). Essentially, this devolution of authority to lower
levels enables more autonomy in local decision-making processes leading to the improved
delivery of public goods and services. Tiebout (1956) initiated the theory that decentralization
can lead to increased efficiency of the delivery of public goods. Asserting that citizens have the
ability to relocate geographically based on a preference of government services in countries
where state power is decentralized (Tiebout 1956). Furthering this idea, Oates (1972) fleshed out
a more inclusive theory about the ideal level of decentralization. Notably, scholars do not have
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consensus on whether decentralization is necessary for the improved delivery of public goods.
In fact, critics highlight that relocating geographically is expensive, and that it is unrealistic that
citizens would move based on tax and spending desires (Manor 1999; Bardhand 2002).
Central governments are increasingly transferring power to elected local government,
hoping to improve the distribution of goods and services by bringing officials closer to the
people (Hankla and Downs 2010). The accountability created between elected local councils and
the people through the process of decentralization is critical. However, the processes mentioned
earlier, on their own, are not sufficient to improve the provision of public goods and services, but
rather, collectively these approaches play a major role in the process. Accordingly, when local
governments are responsible for water services, water accessibility and the reliability of service
provision is greater than when provided by central governments.
Scholars frequently assert that decentralization leads to increased accountability because
the people are closer to the government. Essentially, the local population is better able to monitor
the actions of elected officials when they are local opposed to when they are in the national
capital (Von Braun and Grote 2002). This improved relationship between the local government
and the people leads to more efficient delivery of public goods. Alternatively, other studies
indicate that decentralization leads to increased political participation (Manor 1999; Crook
2003). Moreover, local elected officials are better equipped to determine what the population
needs.
Often decentralization is viewed as way increase public participation, efficiency,
equality, economic development and a way to monitor government resource allocations (Bardhan
2002). When government decision-making is closer to the people, decentralization is asserted to
improve accountability resulting in a more efficient government (Bardhan 2002). In cases where
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power is decentralized to actors not accountable to their people, then it is unlikely that
decentralization will achieve improved delivery of public goods and services (Bardhan 2002).
Moreover, franchise extension has the ability to shift the median voter in a manner that
impacts the size of the government, the redistribution towards the poor, and the delivery of
services, benefiting the newly enfranchised (Meltzer and Richard 1981, Husted and Kenny 1997,
Boix 2003, Aidt and Dallal 2007, Miller 2008, Aidt and Eterovic 2011, Aidt and Jensen 2013,
Fujiwara 2015, Vernby 2012). This reasoning is especially relevant in South Africa as following
the apartheid era, the formally disenfranchised were extended the right to vote shifting the
median voter drastically.
Scholars assert that, municipalities with high numbers of recently enfranchised voters,
and an obvious shift in the median voter, experience higher levels of household electrification in
South Africa between 1996-2001 (Kroth et al. 2016). However, why would this logic and
reasoning only apply to electrification and not the water and sanitation sector? This theory
stipulates that African National Congress (ANC) core constituencies were prioritized leading to
improved service delivery overall (Kroth et al. 2016). However, this theory does not seem to be
applicable to the water and sanitation sector in South Africa despite a highly similar development
process to electrification. While this analysis advances theory in the field regarding
electrification, I think that the interplay between the variables is overlooked and in this analysis I
will attempt to bridge that gap.
Further, parties that have systems dominated by a single party have the ability or power
to disenfranchise those who are less likely to vote for them. A prime example of this
phenomenon would be the Jim Crow laws that disenfranchised black voters in the southern
United States for much of the 20th century. Mechanisms such as voting tax or the requirement to
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pass a literacy test to vote are prime examples of dominant parties disenfranchising potential
opposition groups. However, while voter enfranchisement is highly important in South Africa,
why are the benefits of water security not extended to provinces dominated by formally
disenfranchised voters that are now comprised of the dominant party? In this analysis, I will
include political competition and accountability in an attempt to understand why these benefits
don’t seem to apply to accessibility to improved water source.
Notably, the accountability created between elected local councils and the people through
the process of decentralization is critical. However, the aforementioned processes, on their own,
are not sufficient to improve the provision of public goods and services, but rather, collectively
these approaches play an important role in the process. Ultimately, redistributive politics,
institutions, governance, political competition and decentralization are all important variables
worth considering when analyzing global water and sanitation accessibility.
Despite theoretical advances in the aforementioned fields, a great deal remains
unfinished, to uncover the relationship between local government and the provision of public
goods and services. In this analysis I will advance the literature by discussing the impact of
locally elected municipal government on accessibility to improved water and sanitation.
Likewise, I will uncover the conditions that impede, or advance, the accessibility of improved
water and sanitation.
3

THEORY

In this analysis, building off the existing literature about electoral accountability, the
heart of the theory is that locally elected democratic government creates a vital sense of
responsibility between constituents and public servants. Accountability is built on
decentralization of state power, which is crucial in opening the channels of communication
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between a government and its population. However, decentralization alone does not suffice.
Typically, when power is decentralized, this opens doors to government accessibility, which
builds the foundations of trust between a government and its citizens. Essentially, locally elected
officials are better able to identify the immediate needs of their community and thus can advance
targeted policies focusing on their community’s specific needs.
Decentralization is asserted to deliver many benefits to the public (Bardhan 2002). Often
decentralization is advocated as a way to control the centralized state by minimizing the power
that it holds (Bardhan 2002). By reducing the role of the central government, it enables space for
increased intergovernmental competition, which leads to improved efficiency and responsiveness
of the government (Bardhan 2002). Therefore, decentralization leads to increased accountability,
as the citizenry are closer to the government. As a result, the local population is better able to
monitor the actions of elected officials when they are local as opposed to when they are in the
national capital (von Braun and Grote 2002). This improved relationship between the local
government and constituents leads to improved delivery of public goods.
The accountability between public servants and constituents incentivizes government
officials to provide adequate public goods and services to their respective population.
Constituents hold elected officials accountable when they vote in support of candidates based on
their previous actions while in elected office, and their future credible commitments following
their (re)election (Democratic Linkages Project 2009). While not all citizens cast their vote
according to political accountability, considerably sized factions influence the political outcome
as long as elections are reasonably competitive. Mainly, “anticipating accountability
considerations among voters and competition for office, politicians will try to act with
‘responsiveness’ to critical mass audiences (Democratic Linkages Project 2009, P.1).”
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Essentially, political participation is important to elected officials and improving accountability
between the elected officials and their local constituents increases participation.
Political competition is vital in the electoral process to establish accountability. Scholars
such as Careaga and Weingast (2001) assert that increased amounts of political competition
result in less corruption and thus improved provision of public goods and services. Essentially,
“an incumbent’s re-election odds provide a harsher constraint on policy decisions when
competition is higher than when (s)he has a large electoral advantage (Ashworth et al. 2006 ).”
Thus, with increased electoral competition, there is a credible threat to an incumbent's reelection
and this risk impacts their policy choices and delivery of public goods and services.
Moreover, local government can procure the information advantage as a result of political
accountability (Bardhan 2002). In countries that are democratic, locally elected officials are
accountable to the local electorate (Bardhan 2002). The central government possesses a broader
constituency base diluting their ability to understand the needs of local districts (Bardhan 2002).
Research on electoral competition demonstrates that “low numbers of effective parties” may
inhibit the delivery of public goods by reducing competition thus minimizing the risk of losing
seats during elections, ultimately reducing the delivery of public goods and services (Min
2015:8). While previous research has focused on the size of the party system, much less
attention has been paid to the “temporal stability of party systems” and even less frequently
analyzed is the aforementioned theories in tandem with the accessibility to water and sanitation,
which is what this analysis will accomplish (Min 2015:8).
Resulting from the high-value voters place on public goods, “delivering them creates
electoral payoffs to the political actors who influence their provision” (Min 2015:21). During
competitive elections, the necessity to earn votes is a powerful force that motivates politicians to
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advance public goods and service delivery strategically (Banerjee and Hankla 2014). Essential
public services such as electricity, water and education are of the utmost importance among the
impoverished. Frequently, the impoverished are electorally abundant and resulting from their
vulnerability, their votes can be influenced by providing these services (Min 2015).
Often electoral competition incentivizes elected officials to prioritize the distribution of
public goods and services. In democratic states, the necessity for elected official to harness broad
bases of support leads elected officials to commit to the provision of public goods in underserved
communities (Banerjee and Hankla 2014). Scholars suggest that intermediate levels of party
system size are optimal for public goods provision (Banerjee and Hankla 2014). When the size of
party systems is below the intermediate range, however, competition is reduced and does not
incentivize service provisions (Banerjee and Hankla 2014). On the other hand, when the levels
are above the intermediate range, the system becomes fragmented leading to instability and then
the inability to produce long-term beneficial outcomes (Banerjee and Hankla 2014). This
analysis will extend this theoretical frame of thought to global water and sanitation accessibility.
It is important to understand under what conditions the aforementioned variables can lead
to improved delivery of public goods and services. This investigation alleges that the benefits of
decentralization are contingent on political competition that leads to improved accountability
between the sub-national authorities and the local government. This combination of factors leads
to the improved delivery of public goods and services.
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3.1

Hypotheses
I have two main hypotheses that I will be testing in this paper:

  𝐻! : Countries with democratically elected local governments will posses a higher
percentage of their population living with accessibility to improved water and sanitation
sources as opposed to alternative governments, other things equal.

  𝐻! : Countries with increased levels of political competition will posses a higher
percentage of their population living with accessibility to improved water and sanitation
sources as opposed to alternative governments, other things equal.
4

METHODS

I will primarily utilize Martinez-Vazquez and Hankla’s (2011) dataset for my
independent variables and include indicators for political competition, and local government.
Additionally, I will combine the aforementioned dataset with both the World Development
Indicators (WDI) and the World Health Organization’s Global Health Observatory (GHO) data
for my dependent variables, including variables for improved water source, improved sanitation,
and piped water accessibility. These databases were initiated as a research tool in cross-national
comparisons of political economy as well as political institutions. Furthermore, these databases
provide variables that are disaggregated, possessing the most comprehensive indicators for
measuring local democratic government and water and sanitation accessibility available.
The indicators for local government, independent variable one and two, include: (1) the
presence of municipal elections and (2) the presence of sub-national elections. Additionally, the
indicator utilized for political competition, independent variable three, includes: (3) dominant
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party systems.
The independent variables are indicator variables. Municipal Elections defined as the
presence of elections at the local or municipal level, is coded as follows: the state receives a “0”
if, municipal elections occur. The state receives a “1” if, municipal elections don’t occur.
Likewise, independent variable two, Sub-national Elections, defined as the presence of elections
at the regional or state level is coded as: the state receives a “0” if, sub-national elections occur
and the state receives a “1” if, sub-national elections don’t occur. The measure of political
competition employed, while arguably weak, can be measured cross-nationally. Essentially, this
variable is a transformation of sub-national and municipal role of parties. The municipal role of
parties measure denotes how independent municipal parties are from national parties. This
variable is called, Dominant Party System, and is coded “1” when a dominant party always
wins, and is thus considered less competitive. Whereas the state receives a “0” when the
dominant party is not always elected, thus the elections are considered to be more competitive.
Moreover, the indicators that I am investigating for my dependent variable include: (1)
accessibility to improved water source (2) accessibility to piped water and (3) accessibility to
improved sanitation facilities. These variables are continuous variables measuring the
percentage of a population with improved access to water, sanitation and piped water. To
operationalize my dependent variables, I will utilize the following indicators: Improved Water
Source of Population, Improved Water Source of Rural Population, Improved Water Source of
Urban Population, Improved Sanitation Source of Population, Improved Sanitation Source of
Rural Population, Improved Sanitation Source of Urban Population, and Households using a
Piped Water Source. These variables are calculated as ratios of the number of households with
improved accessibility to water and sanitation to the total number of households reflected as
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household-weighted percentages. The WDI and GHO indicator data are based on the reanalysis
of Demographic and Health Surveys.
The United Nations Children’s Fund and World Health Organization Joint Monitoring
Programme (JMP) define “an improved drinking-water source [as] one that, by the nature of its
construction and when properly used, adequately protects the source from outside contamination
(Joint Monitoring Programme 2016).” Piped water is also considered to be improved water
source, is defined as households using piped water. However, piped water is more difficult to
obtain then simply improved water source. Likewise, an improved sanitation facility is defined
as “ one that hygienically separates human excreta from human contact (Joint Monitoring
Programme 2016).”
To test my hypotheses, I will be running a differenced random effects model utilizing
robust standard errors to discover the relationship between local government and accessibility to
improved water and sanitation sources. Likewise, I will also investigate the relationship between
political competition and improved water and sanitation sources. My unit of analysis in this
investigation is at the country level. I will conduct a cross-national study of 156 countries
between the years of 1990 and 2007 as this timeframe has the most comprehensive data
available. Finally, to minimize the chance of spurious relationships for emerging in this analysis,
I control for Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita, population density, and the percent
of the population living in a rural area, which is calculated as the difference between total
population and urban population.
5

FINDINGS

First, this section will discuss the factors impacting the percentage of the global population
with access to improved drinking water. The first model reported is testing the relationship
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between the improved access to drinking water and sub-national elections, controlling for GDP,
GDP per capita, population density and the percent of the rural population. I utilize a differenced
random effects model with robust standard errors to account for that fact that the variable,
improved access to water overall, is trending.
Table 5.1 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Water Overall

Differenced Improved Access to Water Overall
Lag Improved Access to Water Overall .007**
(.004)
Sub-national Elections
.081*
(.043)
GDP Constant
-.000000009
(.00000001)
GDP Per Capita
-.001
(.001)
Population Density
-.00004
(.0001)
Percent Rural Population
.015***
(.003)
Constant
-.861 **
(.426)
Observations
2444
Countries
156
Overall R2
0.102
Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
In this model the independent variable, sub-national elections, is statistically significant
at the .10% level in influencing a change in accessibility to improved water source. In fact, when
sub-national elections occur, the percentage of people accessing improved water source increases
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by .081 percent. This indicates that the presence of sub-national elections has a statistically
significant relationship with the improved access to water cross-nationally. Essentially, this
means that people living in countries that have sub-national elections are more likely to have
improved accessibility to water globally.

Table 5.2 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Water Overall

Lag Improved Access to Water
Overall
Municipal Elections
GDP Constant
GDP Per Capita
Population Density
Percent Rural Population
Constant
Observations
Countries
Overall R2

Differenced Improved Access to Water Overall
.007**
(.004)
.055*
(.034)
-.000000005
(.00000001)
-.0005
(.001)
-.00005
(.00007)
.016***
(.004)
-. 883 **
(.432)
2444
156
0.099

Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
This model differs from the previous model in that the independent variable, Subnational Elections, is substituted for the variable, Municipal Elections. I can infer from this
model that the presence of municipal elections increases the likelihood of accessibility to
improved water source. In fact, in states with locally elected municipal governments the
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likelihood of access to improved drinking water increases by .055 percent. This indicates that the
presence of municipal elections has a significant relationship with improved access to water
cross-nationally.
Table 5.3 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Water Overall
Differenced Improved Access to Water Overall
	
  
Lag Improved Access to Water Overall
.006*
(.004)
Municipal Elections
.035
(.032)
Sub-national Elections
.061*
(.040)
GDP Constant
-.000000007
(.00000001)
GDP Per Capita
-.0008
(.002)
Population Density
-.00004
(.00007)
Percent Rural Population
.015***
(.003)
Constant
-.857**
(.428)
Observations
2444
Countries
156
2
Overall R
0.107
Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
In this model I tested the relationship between the improved access to drinking water and
municipal and sub-national elections. This model reflects that the percentage of people with
accessibility to improved drinking water remains significant at the .10% level when there are
sub-national elections. Specifically, the presence of sub-national elections is associated with a
.061 percent increase in improved water accessibility. However, the impact of municipal
elections is not significant. I speculate this could be a result of the overlap of responsibilities

25
between sub-national and municipal governments. Likewise, it seems that sub-national elections
are more of the global long-term standard, whereas devolving power to municipal authorities is
more of a recent phenomena, thus rendering the results insignificant.
Table 5.4 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Water Overall

Lag Improved Access to Water
Overall
Dominant Municipal Party
System
GDP Constant
GDP Per Capita
Population Density
Percent Rural Population
Constant
Observations
Countries
Overall R2

Differenced Improved Access to Water Overall
.002
(.004)
.031
(.028)
.000000009
(.000000006)
-.001
( .002 )
-.0003
(.0002)
.012 ***
(.003)
-.258
(.440)
1689
129
0. 250

Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)

This model is testing the relationship between the improved access to drinking water
overall and dominant municipal party system, controlling for GDP, GDP per capita, population
density and the percent of the rural population. In this model I also utilize a differenced random
effects model with robust standard errors. This model reflects that no variable of interest seems
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to be significant. This likely is a result of a potentially problematic indicator for political
competition. I think that to further investigate this particular variable a case study should be
utilized to view political competition at a more nuanced level.
Table 5.5 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Water in Rural Areas

Lag Improved Access to Water Rural
Municipal Elections
Sub-national Elections
GDP Constant
GDP Per Capita
Population Density
Percent Rural Population
Constant
Observations
Countries
Overall R2

Differenced Improved Access to Water Rural
.011***
(.004)
.124***
(.050)
.065
(.057)
.000000004***
(.00000001)
-.005*
(.003)
-.001***
(.0002)
.010***
(.004)
-. 609
(.421)
2427
155
0.001

Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
In this model I am testing the relationship between the improved access to drinking water
in rural areas and municipal and sub-national elections. I continue to control for GDP, GDP per
capita, population density and the percent of the rural population and utilize a differenced
random effects model with robust standard errors. This model indicates that there is only one

27
significant independent variable of interest, which includes, municipal elections. In fact, the
presence of municipal elections increases the accessibility to water in rural areas by.124 percent.
I would speculate that municipal elections are particularly influential in rural areas, as often the
benefits of sub-national elections will trickle down to urban areas whereas rural areas often are
the last to receive benefits from the central governments.
Table 5.6 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Water in Urban Areas

Differenced Improved Access to Water Urban
Lag Improved Access to Water Urban .007
(.003)
Municipal Elections
.035
(.032)
Sub-national Elections
.061*
(.040)
GDP Constant
-.000000007
(.00000001)
GDP Per Capita
-.001
(. 001)
Population Density
-.00004
(.00007)
Percent Rural Population
.015 ***
(.003)
Constant
-.856 **
(.428)
Observations
2444
Countries
156
Overall R2
0. 107

Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
This model differs from the previous model in that the dependent variable, improved
access to water in rural areas, is substituted for urban areas. I can infer from this model that sub-

28
national elections increase the likelihood of accessibility to improved drinking water in urban
areas by .06 percent. In this model I analyzed the relationship between the percentage of people
with improved access to water in urban areas on sub-national and municipal elections, however,
the latter variable did not report significant findings. As I previously mentioned, I think that this
insignificance in municipal elections is perhaps a result of being overshadowed by the more
encompassing variable, sub-national elections as when this model is ran with both variables
separately, both variables report significant finding at the .10 percent level.
Table 5.7 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Sanitation Overall

Lag Improved Access to
Sanitation Overall
Municipal Elections
Sub-national Elections
GDP Constant
GDP Per Capita
Population Density
Percent Rural Population
Constant
Observations
Countries
Overall R2

Differenced Improved Access to Sanitation Overall
.006*
(.003)
.031
(.044)
.075*
(.044)
-.000000005
(.00000001)
-.0031
(.002)
.000002*
(.00003)
.006
(.004)
-.271
(.365)
2417
156
0.001

Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
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In this model I investigate the relationship between the accessibility to improved
sanitation facilities overall and municipal and sub-national elections controlling for GDP, GDP
per capita, population density and the percent of the rural population. Likewise, I utilize a
differenced random effects model with robust standard errors, as improved access to sanitation is
also a trending variable. Sub-national elections have a significant relationship with improved
access to sanitation facilities, with p-values below 0.10. In fact, when there are sub-national
elections, improved access to sanitation overall increases by .075 percent. I suspect that the role
of municipal elections is not reported as significant because efforts to improve sanitation via
local municipal government are recent developments and may not be accurately reflected by the
data.
Table 5.8 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Sanitation Rural

Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
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Sub-national elections have a significant relationship with improved access to sanitation
facilities in rural areas, with p-values below 0.10. In fact, the presence of sub-national elections
increases the accessibility to improved sanitation facilities by .101 percent. As previously
mentioned, this is not particularly surprising, as I suspect that central governments have been
responsible for sanitation facilities for much longer than local municipal governments thus
potentially impacting the results of the model.
Table 5.9 Percentage of People with Improved Access to Sanitation Urban

Lag Improved Access to
Sanitation Urban
Dominant Municipal Party
System
GDP Constant
GDP Per Capita
Population Density
Percent Rural Population
Constant
Observations
Countries
Overall R2

Differenced Improved Access to Sanitation Urban
.005
(.004)
.067*
(.046)
-.000000004
(.000000004)
-.0002
(.001)
.000004
(.0002)
-.0003
(.002)
-.145
(.267)
1689
129
0. 095

Random Effects estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
In this model I investigate the relationship between the accessibility to improved
sanitation facilities in urban areas and dominant municipal party system. This model indicates
that the variable dominant municipal party system is significant when the p-value is below .10
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percent. In fact, in countries where there are dominant municipal party systems, improved
sanitation accessibility in urban areas increases .067 percent. Contrary to my expectations, this
indicates that political competition does not seem to have s significant relationship with
improved sanitation in urban areas as it showcases significance when dominant parties have less
competition. I also ran this same model with both sub-national elections and municipal elections
separately. While municipal elections did not report significant findings, sub-national elections
did in fact indicate a significant relationship with improved access to sanitation facilities in urban
areas with p-values below 0.10.
Table 5.10 Percentage of People with Access Piped Water

Sub-national Elections
Municipal Elections
GDP Constant
GDP Per Capita
Population Density
Rural Area
Constant
Observations
Countries
Overall R2

Access to Piped Water Overall
.914
(4.024)
-.934
(4.023)
-.000004
(.000017)
.884
(.942)
-.007
(.014)
-.708***
(.180)
85. 470 ***
(14.205)
131
58
0.533

Random Effects estimates with standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
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This model investigates factors impacting the percentage of households globally with
access to piped water. The first model reported is testing the relationship between piped water
accessibility and municipal and sub-national elections, controlling for GDP, GDP per capita,
population density and the percent of the rural population. In this analysis I utilize a regular
random effects model, as there is insufficient data for a differenced model with robust standard
errors. From the regression we can see that there are no statistically significant independent
variables. However, I suspect that the insignificant results were an effect of the scarcity of
available data on piped water accessibility. Thus, this particular model must be revisited when
data availability is more comprehensive.
Table 5.11 Percentage of People with Access Piped Water

!
Dominant Municipal Party System
GDP Constant
GDP Per Capita
Population Density
Percent Rural Population
Constant
Observations
Countries
2
Adjusted R

Access to Piped Water Overall
7.737
(7.300)
-.0000005
(.000016)
-.463
(1.053)
-.011
(.014)
-1.000***
(.207)
107. 200 ***
(15.930)
96
44
0.590

Random Effects estimates with standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
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This model also investigates factors impacting the percentage of households globally
with access to piped water. This model is testing the relationship between piped water
accessibility and dominant municipal party system, controlling for GDP, GDP per capita,
population density and the percent of the rural population. Again, in this analysis I utilize a
regular random effects model, as there is insufficient data for a differenced model with robust
standard errors. This model also reflected that there is no variable of interest that has a
significant effect on the percentage of households with piped water accessibility. One possible
factor impacting the results could be the scarcity of household piped water data. Given that there
are no variables of interest in the model that are significant, this model should be revisited when
more data is available.
Table 5.12 Percentage of People with Access Piped Water

Improved Access to Piped Water Overall
4.325
(4.996)
GDP Constant
-.000005
(.00002)
GDP Per Capita
-.571 **
(1.063)
Population Density
-.009 **
(.0142)
Rural Area
-1.002 ***
(.208)
Constant
106.488 ***
(16.024)
Observations
131
Countries
58
Overall R2
0.596
Random Effects estimates with standard errors in parentheses
P < 0.10 * (two-tailed)
P < .05 ** (two-tailed)
P< .01*** (two-tailed)
!
Sub-national Elections
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This model also investigates factors impacting the percentage of households globally
with access to piped water. This model is testing the relationship between piped water
accessibility and sub-national elections, controlling for GDP, GDP per capita, population density
and the percent of the rural population. In this model I continue to use a regular random effects
model, as there is insufficient data for a differenced model with robust standard errors. In this
model there are no independent variables of interest that are statistically significant in
influencing the accessibility to piped water. Based on this, I can infer that when analyzing the
role sub-national elections the percent of households with accessibility to piped water source will
not be significantly impacted. However, resulting from the fact the piped water accessibility has
only recently starting being tracked, this model should be revisited when more data is available.
Overall, the empirical models reflect several significant findings. Particularly, the role of
municipal and sub-national elections on improved accessibility to water and sanitation is notable.
In fact, the presence of municipal elections (Municipal Election) is statistically significant across
multiple models, and in two out of the seven models reported in this analysis that test municipal
elections as the independent variable. In particular, the municipal elections variable is highly
significant when analyzed with accessibility to improved water source in rural areas. Indicating
that local municipal government plays an important role in the accessibility to improved water
source in rural areas. I would speculate that this is in part a result of increased levels of
accountability between smaller populations and their municipal government.
Furthermore, municipal elections, is also significant when analyzing accessibility to
improved water source overall. Indicating that again, the presence of municipal elections does
seem to have a significant impact on the accessibility to improved water source globally. It is
notable that in instances, when I analyze models with both sub-national elections and municipal
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elections, the results for municipal elections are often rendered insignificant. I speculate that this
could be a result of the variable municipal elections being overshadowed by the sub-national
election variable, as often regional and national elections have stood the test of time whereas
municipal elections are more recent phenomena. However, I am confident that these significant
findings are not circumstantial and indicate the need for further research and development in
understanding the relationship between local municipal government and accessibility to
improved water and sanitation facilities cross-nationally.
Likewise, the presence of sub-national elections (Sub-national Elections) is statistically
significant across multiple models and specifically in five of the eight models reported in this
analysis that test sub-national elections as an independent variable. Primarily, this model is
significant when looking at improved access to water overall, improved access to sanitation
overall as well as when looking specifically in rural and urban areas. I think this significance
clearly indicates that sub-national elections are highly important globally and have clear
implications in the water and sanitation sector. Essentially, looking forward I think this finding
means that sub-national elections impact various facets of society including water and sanitation
and thus should be duly considered in the analysis of public goods and service delivery.
Finally, of the three models where Dominant Party System was the independent variable,
only one model revealed significant findings. However, the low levels of statistical significance
could be a result of utilizing a broad and potentially problematic indicator for political
competition. The model that reported significant findings with the dominant party system
includes improved access to sanitation in urban areas, which was actually contradictory to my
expectations indicating that dominant municipal party systems leads to increased accessibility to
sanitation in urban areas. However, in the future, I think political competition needs to be further
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developed by scholars in terms of identifying the relationship between this variable and water
and sanitation sector. Moreover, in regard to piped water accessibility, at this time, the data is
insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. Thus piped water accessibility should be further
developed in the future when data accessibility is readily available.
6

CONCLUSION

Sanjay Wijesekera, head of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) global water,
sanitation and hygiene (WASH) program remarked that a “lack of sanitation is a reliable marker
of how the poorest in a country are faring” (UNICEF 2014). The consequences of lack of
sanitation and water accessibility are widespread and pervasively impact vulnerable populations.
The influence of local government on accessibility to improved water source and sanitation will
continue to be a salient issues in academia and global policy. The key question is whether local
government and political competition will lead to improved accessibility to water and sanitation
sources. While results in the literature vary substantially, it is undeniable that local government
plays an important role in the provision of public goods and services.
This analysis tests two primary hypotheses. My primary hypothesis draws on existing
literature to theoretically reason that the presence of elections increases water accessibility.
Through my analysis of 156 countries, this study supports the primary hypothesis through
random effects analysis across a number of models. Regarding the second hypothesis, pertaining
to political competition leading to improved accessibility to water and sanitation, the findings
were inconclusive indicating a need for further research and development. While there is space
for further research in development regarding the interplay between political competition,
governance and the accessibility of improved water and sanitation, this paper is but a small step
in revealing the importance of local democratic government and its interplay with the delivery of
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public goods and services.
In light of the SDG’s recognizing water and sanitation and the international community
moving toward piped water accessibility as the standard for improved water source, data
availability on this topic will soon be forthcoming. Scholars should continue to advance research
on water and sanitation issues, as they will only increase in importance. Essentially, my findings
indicate that sub-national and municipal government officials are better able to identify the needs
of their community and provide accessibility to improved water and sanitation. Likewise, it
seems that countries that possess sub-national or municipal elections also have corresponding
increased government responsiveness in the water and sanitation sector. This suggests that there
is a role for both municipal and subnational government in ensuring that the preferences of
citizens are reflected in policy. It is my hope that this analysis is a step toward understanding the
integral relationship between local government and the delivery of public goods and services in
the water and sanitation sector.
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